Miguel Sánchez
Today no one can question the global success of the VW Type 1. However, it is still a rather questionable model. To begin with, there is the position of the engine hanging in the rear as well as the poor use of interior space. Moreover, with respect to the honesty of the design itself, it has been in question since its inception. Not in vain, even Ferdinand Porsche admitted to using the Tatra T97 as an obvious inspiration. So much so that the Czechoslovakians filed a complaint for plagiarism. He denounces that his administrative journey was stopped after the Nazi invasion. However, it was finally reopened after the war to put an end to Volkswagen having to compensate the government of Prague in 1961 for that technological looting.
Anyway, be that as it may, the truth is that the VW Type 1 experienced remarkable commercial success around the world. Especially in the United States, where at the end of the sixties the demand was so high that it put the delivery time in more than six months. So things, the German house received enormous financial support with which to expand its objectives already in the sixties. Thanks to this, in 1964 it began the absorption of Auto Union to only three years later acquire the iconic NSU. In addition, in a discreet but constant way, it was expanding all the facilities related to design and innovation.
And it is that, at this point, Volkswagen was fully aware of the serious danger it was facing. A danger marked by the lack of news. Not surprisingly, during the sixties most of the mass manufacturers in Europe were presenting products that were as innovative as they were effective. Aware of the rise of the middle classes, their tourism vehicles were getting better and better in matters such as habitability, safety, behavior, mechanics and design. All this while Volkswagen was still stuck in its outdated rear-engined designs. Obviously much less interesting than a FIAT 124, a Ford Taunus P4 or a Peugeot 204.
With all this, the new research and development departments launched into a race to generate new designs. However, most of them continued to reproduce the scheme of the "All behind" interpreted by the Type 1. Proof of this was the Type 3 1500/1600 and, especially, the Type 4 411/412 of the late sixties. A model that, despite innovations such as direct injection mounted on some variants, represented a complete failure for Volkswagen in the midst of a market clearly dominated by the front engine. At this point, Kurt Lotz -director of Volkswagen since the death in 1968 of the historic Heinrich Nordhoff- entrusted Porsche with the creation of a model with which to replace the Type 1. Thus the EA266 project was born.
VOLKSWAGEN EA266, AS ORIGINAL AS IT IS PROBLEMATIC
At the end of the sixties, a young Ferdinand Piëch already stood out as director of development at Porsche. Thanks to this, his ingenuity was the maximum responsible for the EA266. A project as daring as it was ill-fated, which It started from an idea that was not common in passenger cars in the C segment: place the engine in a central position. Obviously, from the point of view of weight distribution this was exceptional. In fact, if the EA266 had come to series, it would surely have displayed a more than remarkable poise.
However, doing this posed quite a few problems in the case of a utility vehicle with two rows of seats. Because of this, Porsche's solution was to place the mechanics longitudinally with four boxer cylinders under the rear seats. In this way, Piëch raised the EA 266 as a familiar “comfortable, safe to drive, spacious and compact” without giving up a certain sporty behavior. Something that, on paper, certainly sounds not only fantastic but even possible. In addition, he insisted on the possibility that all this was a versatile platform. Thus being the starting point for a powerful range with tourism, sports and van models.
In any case, when a pre-series with 50 prototypes was produced, problems did not take long to appear. To begin with, placing the engine below the passenger compartment caused annoying fumes to leak into the passengers. This fact is aggravated by the worrying projection of heat. In addition, access to the engine was really complex because it could only be accessed through the underbody of the car. Because of this, Any small repair or maintenance required the logistics of a workshop with an elevator or pit. All topped off with the enormous cost of production demanded by the EA266. Totally unfeasible for a design with the aspiration to succeed Type 1.
At this point, in 1971 the management of Volkswagen suspended the project of this hypothetical family car with a central engine. Likewise, the brand's engineers already had the EA337 quite advanced at that time. Prototype from which the 1974 Golf would derive, opting for the front engine and a fully habitable design by Giorgetto Giugiaro. After this, the German house wanted to erase the memory of everything that happened with the EA266. Not surprisingly, not a few efforts had gone into it, as well as a considerable sum of money, sponsoring a model that intended to have the same mechanics as the Porsche 914/4. The fleeting possibility of having seen a Golf with mid-engine.
Photos: Volkswagen Group
