The enigma Eduardo Barreiros

Branded as "engine of the regime" even though he never acted as organic Franco, Eduardo Barreiros built an industrial empire from nothing that still arouses admiration -and even perplexity, taking into account the tripping that the administration itself put on it from the then all-powerful National Institute of Industry-, moved by a personal effort that can be fairly described as quixotic.

Various works have been published on the character and his company, understood in a broad sense since he undertook many and varied throughout his life (bus lines, motors, trucks, cars, roads, ports...).

Si The Spanish Dodge. The prodigious adventure of Eduardo Barreiros (Dossat, 1997) by Pablo Gimeno, sticks to the automotive aspect, in It is a Spanish engine! Barreiros business history (Synthesis, 2001) there is the academic vision of José Luis García Ruiz and Manuel Santos Redondo, professors of economic history of the Complutense, also authors of another much more interesting title, Barreiros Diesel and the development of the automotive industry in Spain 1954-1969 (El Viso, 2004), with a foreword by Hugh Thomas.

On the other hand, both the book by Marino Gómez Santos Eduardo Barreiros. From Franco's Spain to Fidel's Cuba (New Library, 2006) as Orestes died in Havana (Foca, 2003), a novel by the journalist Elvira Daudet, whose protagonist shows amazing similarities with Eduardo Barreiros, has its axis in the vital vicissitudes of the businessman.

Neither of these two books, curiously, has the approval of the Foundation.

Our country does not have an abundance of authors capable of compiling the trajectory of historical figures in extensive and well-documented biographies. This practice is common in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, and to it belongs the aforementioned Hugh Thomas, a renowned historian who needs no introduction -although it is surprising to find him delving into the lives of automotive figures- and author of Barreiros. The engine of Spain (Planeta, 2007), a work that appeared some time ago that did not attract the attention it undoubtedly deserved.

Originally titled Don Eduardo and The Recovery of Spain, the book (apparently, the last bet of Ymelda Navajo as editorial director of Planeta) transcends the mere biographical story to become a fresco of the Spanish history of the last century, and not only in its industrial aspect.

The analysis is in depth, even too much, because in a display of erudition, Thomas shows off his knowledge of political troubles that surround the months and weeks before and immediately after the military uprising of 1936, leading the reader into diatribes that are irrelevant, given that the biographee, despite fighting on the rebel side for his Carlist conviction and religious faith, did not harbor the slightest interest in politics.

It can be said, however, that Barreiros would make good Franco's famous sophist pun "do like me, don't get involved in politics", although in spite of himself he had to do it - he put the dictator's own first cousin, Francisco Franco Salgado-Araújo, on his board of directors - due to the suspicions he aroused in certain sectors of the regime itself.

The leaders of the time, mostly military, did not like someone to go free, and Eduardo Barreiros did not belong to any specific group.

Eduardo Barreiros, the Spanish King Midas

Defined by the American press as “the Spanish King Midas who turns everything he touches into gold” -in 1954 it is the cover of the magazine Life-, is a man of strong personal magnetism who transmits solidity and arouses the confidence of his interlocutors.

Barreiros does not burst into the automotive industry like an elephant in a china shop, but rather with a extensive experience in transport, public works and mechanical industry in general, and is supported by a team of stalwarts, his three brothers and a group of engineers, lawyers and economists (some of whom will make a career in this or other fields, such as Iñigo Cavero or Juan Miguel Antoñanzas), while at a financial level he counts with the support of Tomás de Bordegaray, director of Banco de Vizcaya.

Barreiros was in his time one of the most advanced companies in the country -psychotechnical department, suggestion box, social benefits...- governed by a paternalistic leader who conceived his mission as a whole, with a certain mystical touch but, according to testimonies, devoid of the messianism that sometimes characterizes this class of characters. Certainly, he must have had a good grip on his own ego.

EB took his company to a high level and opened his eyes to Europe, while the government put sticks in his wheels and the strong industrial lobby in Spain -Babcock Wilcox, Euskalduna, Motor Ibérica…- tried to annoy him as much as they could. The industrial policy established by the lNI seemed aimed at stifling private entrepreneurship, which, paradoxically, it viewed as a threat.

But National Stabilization Plan of Navarro Rubio y Ullastres promulgated in 1959 is a full-fledged attack on the structure of the INI, the Suanzes farmhouse, and opens the door of exports to Barreiros that thus begins its golden age.

The demolition of the autarkic system makes it possible not only to begin testing foreign markets, but also to open up to foreign investment. Manufacturing passenger cars is the next goal.

Eduardo Barreiros begins the dance for several European countries in Looking for a brand to partner with or license. In the UK he talks to David Brown (Aston Martin), William Lyons (Jaguar) and Lord Rootes (Rootes group). The German Borgward is going through low hours just like Simca, still independent. Both Ford and General Motors demand that the Spanish company become a mere subsidiary. In the end he stays with Chrysler.

And with the colossus of the pentastar we have come across. According to Thomas, "EB made a misjudgment that can be attributed mainly to his satisfaction in maintaining close relationships with a giant." For one of the witnesses of the time, the lawyer Javier González Gurriarán, who worked with Íñigo Cavero and later with EB,

“We could all see that Chrysler would force us to make more and more investments of a size and scale that a family business could not afford. Valeriano was worried from the beginning. But Eduardo no, at least not at that time (1963). He only cared about two things: selling his trucks and making his passenger cars."

However, neither the Dodge Dart was suitable for our country (A basic model in the US but too big, expensive -almost twice as much as a SEAT 1500- and expensive, whose quality left a lot to be desired) nor the Simca 1000, later included in the production plans after passing the French brand under the control of Chrylser, came to be sold as expected by having to compete with other all behind, the Renault 8 and the Seat 850 and 600, already established in the national market.

Our historiography has been holding that Barreiros was used by Chyrsler as a bridgehead to settle in Spain. And this also seems to be Thomas's thesis in a work in which some readers believe they have caught a certain exculpatory bias, on the one hand of the supposed colaboracionismo of EB with the Franco regime and the dictator himself, and on the other of his condition as a victim of the shady dealings of the North American corporation.

For García Ruiz and Santos Redondo, who are the ones who have investigated the matter most thoroughly, «The entry of Chrysler seems to be the crucial mistake of EB (…) The mix of purchases tied to the parent company, the poor choice of the model and, above all, the size of the annual production, would make the profitable company that Barreiros was in 1963 , even with treasury problems due to the volume of its installment sales, became a company with million-dollar losses and accumulation of stocks, especially luxurious Dodges».

Did Chrysler betray Eduardo Barreiros?

Can it be said that, in a way, Chrysler betrayed Barreiros? It is true that he relied on the global network of the American company to deliver the industrial vehicles that it manufactured in Villaverde, but as he himself wrote in his resignation letter, this was not the case.

«We gave up the majority because we saw that the company would have greater volume (…). Chrysler promised to increase exports by relying on its worldwide network and pledging not to bring to Spain more than the personnel strictly necessary for certain technical departments. The results have been completely opposite ».

That Eduardo Barreiros was responsible - sole or jointly - for the colossal miscalculation (planning a production of 20.000 cars a year and selling 5.000 in four) does not seem to exempt Chrysler from its intention to play along until it suits its interests. It was not necessary to throw out the indigenous partner: he just got into the mousetrap and on top of that he paid the price assuming the lion's share with his own participation in the capital.

The Galician was a skilful company captain while he sailed through familiar waters -industrial vehicles, Spanish partners- but he missed the course by entering the stormy ocean of international capitalism and falling (or allowing himself to be caught) into the nets of the pentastar corsair. Even so, there are still things that seem to have no explanation.

Therefore, the testimony of an anonymous retired Chrysler engineer is extremely interesting, who experienced the events closely and reflects this in the following comment, published in October 2010 on the Barnes & Noble website, which I quote below, translated from English:

“The investigation regarding Chrysler leaves a lot to be desired. Thomas only interviewed Spanish executives, whose main interest was to cover their backs. His statements range from errors to lies. EB was in charge of everything. He listened too much to some subordinates, especially Carranza and Baquero, who told him what he wanted to hear ».

And he made two fatal mistakes. He calculated a production of 20.000 annual units of the Dodge Dart, against Chrysler's 5.000, which he had decided to give free rein due to the success shown in the past. The advisers came at his request but had no authority, and kept out of the daily operations. His task was to assist in the implementation of already proven systems in the US.”.

EB authorized the purchase of 20.000 sets of components, and then the contracting of the required labor. His mistake was compounded by starting production on a massive scale instead of doing it gradually and in this way ensure the suitability of the new facilities, the new machinery and the new elements supplied by local suppliers (Chrysler had manufactured 2,5 million vehicles, so the quality of the body parts it supplied was proven ) and the correct training of inexperienced employees.

“I was one of the Chrysler engineers who recommended a gradual product rollout, which was the norm in the auto industry. EB chose to reject this advice. The results were highly predictable: cars with missing parts, poor fit, water and air leaks, electrical problems, etc..

“The quality of these first units was a blow to the image of the Dart in the Spanish market. Sales fell well below expectations. And the company had to drag a heavy ballast in stock and labor costs for years. The coup de grace came later, when it was said that the ownership of a Dart showed that one had an annual income of at least one million pesetas».

The Dart was a highly successful model elsewhere, built in plants around the world, which was 16 years in the making with a total production of almost 4 million units, and No. 1 in sales in various markets.

«I spent three years as a consultant in Madrid, and I consider myself a Hispanophile, as Thomas seems to be. But I couldn't sit idly by and ignore these criticisms without answering, as some of my colleagues are no longer here to defend themselves. We did everything we could to help Barreiros become a successful company."

“I left Chrysler over thirty-five years ago, so I owe him no loyalty as an employee, but I must honestly say that Chrysler's relations with Barreiros were always honorable. For former Spanish executives to imply otherwise is malicious and despicable. Thomas should have picked up on this bias in his statements, and he should have talked to some of the Chrysler employees who were involved!”

In 1969, Eduardo Barreiros resigned from his positions at Barreiros Diesel pledging to stay out of the car business for ten years, he embarked on a farm with no idea of ​​the matter, and again succeeded.

He transformed a five thousand hectare secarral from La Mancha into a huge farm, Puerto Vallehermoso. In parallel, he maintained various companies dedicated to the real estate sector, such as Cefi, directed for some time by Pío Cabanillas.

And there it happened the second fall of Eduardo Barreiros. Ten years after leaving Chrysler, the mechanic turned businessman crashed again due to the mismanagement of his administrators: Cefi declared bankruptcy. Some time later, EB put land in the middle (or rather, an entire ocean) and began a new professional career in Cuba, the last stage of his life, the details of which we may analyze another time.

The Barreiros enigma

The central part of the book, full of financial and business analysis, makes it difficult for the non-seasoned reader to follow. And on the other hand, it does not clarify anything about the technology and patents that Barreiros used, precisely one of the issues that has always brought fans upside down: the degree of originality of Barreiros' creations, such as the Perkins theme, does not make it clear if it is a copy, but improved, of Ricardo's first projects, a “pseudo Perkins”.

Because the concept does exist: “We must not forget that in those days it was not really invented; in a certain sense, everything was copied (...) At first the Berliet booths were copied with difficulty by Costa, in Barcelona, ​​and later by Elejabarri”.

En este sentido, the book perhaps disappoints barreirophiles in some passages. Thomas ventures through the intricacies of the car, despite using good sources (Georgano), with comments that reveal a superficial knowledge of the matter, such as when he comments on technical aspects -"The Simca Ariane (...) was economical, but the acceleration was bad" -; but the anecdote of Enzo Ferrari and Ricart's rubber soles, that classic gossip in automotive history, is already too hackneyed.

Subsection: despite being a seasoned driver and having owned the best models of the time -Cadillac Eldorado, Mercedes 300 SL, Pegaso Z-102…-, the facts show that Eduardo Barreiros did not understand much about passenger cars, whether they were luxurious or popular, his thing was clearly heavy mechanics.

Thomas' verboseness is endless and sometimes infuriating.. Professors document everything, even what is not necessary (page 196), which is why he may suffer from excessive citations.

There is a certain lack of coordination between the text and the footnotes (some are a bit confusing) as if that cumbersome prolixity might have been lost in the otherwise correct translation by Mariano Antolín Rato, who has retained an adjective british style –“sad, but stimulating song”-. The epithets that Thomas assigns to certain characters are at least debatable; If you haven't met them, they sound somewhat rhetorical...

Two decades after his disappearance, Barreiros continues to be a public figure. With regard to this book, much was said about Barreiros' relationship with PRISA -he was one of its first shareholders-, about the relationship of this company with him through his daughter Mariluz, ex-wife of the late Jesús de Polanco, and about the alleged collusion of the media with the Foundation, or with the British author, and other speculations closer to conspiracy theories than to the simple truth of the facts. At the end of the day, what matters is the existence of the work, with its pros and cons –it has everything-, not what is written from this or another medium about the character. The intelligent reader will appreciate it. In fact, once you get into his reading you wish it would never end, perhaps because he realizes that the Barreiros enigma continues in force.