Miguel Sánchez
With sales revenue set at more than 37.600 billion euros, Porsche closed the fiscal year of last 2022 with a 13,6% increase in profitability Over the previous year. Thus, the president of its Board of Directors Oliver Blume declared that he was truly satisfied at having achieved “By far the best result in Porsche history” still in “difficult conditions”.
In this way, it goes without saying how the German company has been one of the most powerful and profitable automobile companies in the sector for years without having left its character aside.premium”. However, these results They didn't appear out of nowhere and, in fact, they would never have been produced without quite a few script changes, rethinkings and even traumatic events.
In this sense, the most purists will immediately think of the appearance of the Cayenne and Panamera; as far from 911 as essential for profitability of Porsche and, therefore, the existence of the iconic "All behind". Likewise, this realistic spirit when designing and marketing models a priori far from the most classic identity of the brand already started in the 70s with the Porsche 924 equipped with Audi block.
Furthermore, we cannot leave aside the good work of his consulting service. Essential for balancing accounts in the German company and, ultimately, responsible for placing engineering designed in Stuttgart in models as diverse as the Simca 1000, the first generation SEAT Ibiza or the Audi RS2 Avant.
However, if we understand Porsche's financial history - discounting the significance of its entry into the US market– there is a crucial date when it comes to understanding how this did not end in a resounding bankruptcy.
We refer to the July 27, 1994. Day on which, for the first time, a 911 finally left the assembly line without faults, without the need for any retouching before sending it to the market.
THE OLD PRODUCTION METHOD AT PORSCHE
After the immense growth recorded by American demand - starting with 15 units a year and only a few months later delivering more than half of the production - Porsche had to adapt quickly at a completely different work pace.
Due to this, the brand's workshops went from slow, artisanal manufacturing to a frenetic pace with thousands of units assembled each year. From here on, both the range and the clientele grew and, although at Porsche they adapted assembly lines, warehouses and relations with the auxiliary industry, the truth is that it never stopped short to design an efficient system for mass production from scratch.
However, that seemed to matter very little because, after all, the German house sold at a constant rate; always supported by the great benefits provided by its dealer network on the other side of the Atlantic. Thanks to this he was able overcoming the 1973 Oil Crisis and even cover the large costs represented by its competition program in the World Brands Championship.
A self-complacent situation in which, really, it mattered little whether production could be made more efficient. In fact, among the management it was well known how the assembly lines worked at the fastest and sloppiest pace possible, without special detail in the assembly and, therefore, having to spend a large amount of time on fix errors after mounting each unit.
In short, a way of working that is not only inefficient in terms of time but also terribly deficient in terms of finishes. Something that, in the end, had to take its toll as soon as a commercial situation as complex as the one experienced in the early 1990s arrived.
JAPAN ENTER THE PORSCHE FACTORY
Reviewing tables with accounting results, we observed how Porsche's trajectory fell dramatically during the second half of the 1980s. Besieged by increasing competition as well as the obvious international financial recession, it went from producing more than 58.000 units in 1986 to only about 15.000 seven years later.
Neither more nor less than three quarters less to, in addition, create a huge hole of losses with more than 180 million in the red at the close of the 1993 fiscal year. But the worst was not that, the worst was the attitude of some executives incapable of assuming responsibilities. What's more, far from undertaking severe self-criticism, they only gave explanations related to external factors, of falling demand in the luxury sector, without taking into account the evident inefficiency that has occurred in assembly lines for decades.
At this point, rumors began to circulate in Stuttgart about the possible sale of Porsche to an Asian multinational, as has happened today with the historic Lotus. However, in 1991 the former director of the brand Wendel Wiedeking He returned to the company's offices after a brief career in the auxiliary industry. Place where, fortunately, she had been able to learn first-hand about the work methods developed by Japanese motorsports.
Incredibly efficient, it had undertaken a true revolution from the late 1950s onwards to become a leader -and even a leader if we talk about motorcycles- beyond its borders.
Furthermore, under the aegis of technicians such as Taiichi Ohno - who designed the innovative method of work organization implemented by Toyota in the sixties - he managed not only to assemble the first time with excellent quality, but also maximize work performance and even save significantly on logistics.
In short, if Henry Ford defined the bases of chain assembly adapted to large series, the Japanese industry perfected it to make the same a seamless mechanism. Just what Porsche needed at the beginning of the nineties, although the pride of more than one worker and manager had to fall by the wayside.
AN IMPACT TREATMENT
After quite a bit of reluctance, Wendelin Wiedeking finally managed to convince the Porsche management of the need to hire Japanese consultants with freedom of decision in order to correct the situation. In this way, finally around 1993 A specialized team went to the German factory without any fear of its name, history and prestige.
To begin with, they made the managers go down to the assembly lines dressed in overalls. Not only a demonstration of his unreserved authority, but also a good idea when putting the board in receipt of reality. After this they analyzed the way in which the workers' movements were carried out and wow, the truth is that this was really catastrophic.
With parts scattered in huge warehouses, each operator spent a large amount of time just moving from here to there; a fact that, stopwatch in hand, attention was paid to the neuralgic work point where the vehicle was being assembled. Likewise, and in an effort to do without those warehouses as much as possible, the Japanese consultants They reorganized the relationship with suppliers of parts in order to make them scrupulously comply with delivery times.
Thanks to this, each piece received was used almost as soon as it was delivered to be assembled without having to go through a huge and complex network of shelves. It was like shopping and cooking without having to organize the pantry and refrigerator. Clear, simple, direct and above all very well greased based on commitment, punctuality and work between all parties involved.
Furthermore, the Japanese they had no mercy when applying all that. It was a complete shock therapy and, although its implementation caused quite a bit of controversy and disappointment, its results spoke for themselves a few months after it was applied. That said, on the aforementioned July 27, 1994, Porsche finally produced a 911 for the first time in its long history without any need to spend time correcting assembly failures. What's more, the production time of this model had been reduced by two thirds.
In short, the quality of the vehicles had clearly improved and, what is more important, the productivity of the hour worked had increased incredibly, making the workers' daily lives easier and more efficient. Workers whom, by the way, was encouraged to participate in the constant improvement of the factory through suggestions taken into account by the management.
After this, Porsche's financial situation undertook a radical turn, allowing it to focus on the development of the 1996 Boxster - an entry-level model. necessary to balance the accounts– and the Cayenne launched in 2002 - full confirmation of the bullish sales experienced by the historic German house. All this, let us not forget, thanks to the vigorous and efficient Japanese work mentality.
Images: Porsche
